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Abstract
We examine decentralization { the use of more than one decision maker { in small- to medium-sized
organizations, with a particular focus on family rms. If a rm has a single decision maker, almost all
are male with a average of 15 years managerial experience. Our estimation results suggest that larger
rms decentralize more often, as do rms with newer owners, organizations with a greater proportion
of managers and rms in which non-directors have a signicant ownership stake. On the other hand,
centralization (using one key decision maker) is more likely in rms that use network communication
technologies and benchmark rm performance. In regards to family rms, the relationship between
ownership and decision making is nuanced. Overall, however, family-owned businesses are more likely to
centralize, and this is particularly true when a family member is the director or proprietor. Furthermore,
both rst- and second-generation family rms have a greater tendency to be centralized than non-family
businesses.
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1 Introduction
Without exaggeration, the allocation of decision-making authority is one of the key management choices a
rm faces; this choice, no doubt, can make or break a rm. Recently, as a consequence, there has been
a growing academic literature on the delegation of decision-making rights in organizations. For example,
Colombo and Delmastro (2004) examine the delegation of capital and labor-related decisions in Italian
manufacturing plants. They nd delegation is more likely in larger organizations and for labor decisions.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) consider the prot-versus-cost center choice, showing that delegation is more likely
to occur in new rms that are closer to the productivity frontier.1 Bloom et al. (2010) nd that delegation is
related to a more competitive product market. Similarly, Meagher and Wait (2014) show that delegation of
the decision to introduce a signicant organizational change is more likely when product market competition
is strong, in larger rms and when a workplace exports.
This paper contributes to this empirical literature in two key ways. First, our unique data allows us
to examine the decentralization of decision making, in contrast to delegation, in that we consider whether
or not a rm uses one person (centralization) or more than one individual (decentralization) to make its
major decisions. While decentralization naturally requires some delegation, delegation need not require the
dispersion of decision making rights. In this way, our measure of decentralization examines a complementary
aspect of decision-making authority to the measures used in the existing research.
Second, our unique data allows us to also examine the dierences between family and non-family rms.
Moreover, there are also questions about what constitutes a family rm (see Chua et al. (1999) and Chua
et al. (2003) for example). Not only do we know whether a rm is family owned, we also have details on the
type of family operation a rm is (family member as a director, or an employee or as a non-working decision
maker) and how many generations of family ownership a rm has enjoyed. In addition, we have information
on the diversity of ownership and the length of tenure of the rm's current owner. To our knowledge, this
level of detail regarding ownership and decision-making authority is novel. Among other things, this allows
us to extend the research of Feltham and Barnett (2005). Feltham and Barnett (2005) examine decision
making in Canadian family-owned businesses and found that family businesses are highly dependent on a
single individual for decision making; their results show that owner-managers made all major decisions in at
least three of ve functional areas in 65 per cent of rms. Moreover, dependence on the single decision maker
is decreasing in the value of the rm, the number of shareholders, the age of the rm and the age of the
manager (his or her proximity to retirement). However, dependence on a single decision maker is more likely
when the owner-manger's family have voting control within the rm. This study also complements Fiegener
(2010) who found that self-owned rms have signicantly less family involvement family-owned rms that
have a broader ownership base. By analyzing decision making using novel data, we contribute to the study
of the organizational structure in family rms, one of the most prevalent types of business in the world (see
1Also see Christie et al. (2003) for a study of the prot-versus-cost center decision.
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La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Anderson and Reeb (2003)).2
Theories of the delegation of decision making have focused on: incentives (Aghion and Tirole (1997),
Acemoglu et al. (2007), Zabojnik (2002) and Bester (2004)); communication with informed but biased agents
(Dessein, 2002) and information processing (Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Van Zandt
(1999)). As a framework for our empirical analysis of decentralization, we utilize the arguments of Fama and
Jensen (1983); when a decision maker is not a major residual claimant, decision-making rights need to be
diversied so as to guard against opportunistic behavior. Specically, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that
decision management (authority regarding initiation and implementation of a project) should be separated
from decision-control rights (ratication and monitoring of a project) to mitigate agency costs. From this,
we predict that there will be greater decentralization of decision-making rights when decision makers are
non-owners, as in non-family rms and when the director does not have a signicant ownership stake in the
rm.
Another reason to use more than one decision maker for major decisions is if the requisite information is
held by dierent individuals and it is impractical to transfer this information to one person. Acemoglu et al.
(2007) argue that delegation is more likely in technological advanced rms as the crucial knowledge is more
likely held by those lower down in hierarchy. In a similar way, delegation occurs in Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
as workers on the shop-oor have information about local conditions that is not known by the central oce.
Following this, decentralization is more likely in larger rms, as there are probably a greater range of complex
decisions to be made. Similarly, a new owner { who has less experience at that rm due to their limited
tenure { is less likely to have all the required information to make an informed decision, increasing the use of
decentralization. On the other hand, use of a single key decision maker is more likely when information can
be transferred to one individual, for example when there the rm has an integrated information-technology
network, and when the scope of the rm is relatively contained, such as when a rm contracts out production
of some inputs to external parties { this allows a rm to focus on their core activities more readily.
Our key empirical ndings, outlined in Section 3, are as follows. We nd an increase in the probability
of centralization in family-owned rms. The relationship between decision making and family involvement,
however, is not straightforward; centralization is more likely when a rm has a family owner working as
a director or proprietor. However, centralization is not any more likely in family rms than in non-family
businesses if a rm characterizes itself as a family rm because it has: family members who are non-employees
that contribute to decision making; family members working as employees in the operation. We also nd
that decentralization is more likely when there is a lower share of the rm owned by the director. These
results are consistent with the predictions of Fama and Jensen (1983); there is an increased probability of a
separation of decision management and decision control (hence decentralization) relating to major decisions
of the rm when agents are not major wealth holders in the business.
2Family-owned rms account for 83 per cent of all businesses in Australia account for approximately 50 per cent of private
sector employment (Dana et al. (2010).
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Succession is an issue of major concern for many family businesses (Chua et al., 2003). We nd that
both rst- and second-generation family rms make greater use of a single decision maker than their non-
family rm counterparts. On the other hand, rms with three or more generations of family ownership are
not more centralized than non-family rms. This suggests that there is a change in the decision-making
structure in family rms upon succession, as suggested by Nguyen and Wait (2012) who argued parent
owners have dierent preferences than their successor children. These changes in decision-making structure
could also be due to dierences in what each generation knows about the business; for example, Saito (2008)
found that after succession, nancial performance improved in a family rm that separated ownership and
decision-making authority by making use of a professional manager.
In a similar way to Acemoglu et al. (2007) who nd that younger rms use more delegation, our results
suggest that rms with younger owners decentralize more; this is consistent with the notion that tenure
provides the opportunity for an owner to gather the required information to make eective decisions. We
also nd that centralization of decision authority is more likely when: a rm has an integrated communication
technology network; contracts out activities it previously undertook; benchmarks itself against its rivals; and
has a formal business plan. On the other hand, use of multiple decision makers is more likely in rms with
a higher proportion of managers as a fraction of total employees; organizations with a higher proportion of
managers are more likely to be dealing with a broader range of decisions of greater complexity (as in the
hierarchy model of Garicano (2000)). These ndings are also consistent with information-processing models
that predicts that decision-making rights will be decentralized to make better use of dispersed knowledge.
Finally, centralization is more likely when a rm exports some of its output, and when it operates at
more than one location. This second result, in particular, suggests that a rm centralizes decision-making
rights when coordination is important (see Alonso et al. (2008)).
2 Data Set
We use the Business Longitudinal Survey 1995-1998 (BLS95), a cross-industry survey conducted between
1995-98 of 9550 Australian rms with less than two hundred employees.3 This data has the advantage of
having detailed information on each rm's: (i) decision-making structure; (ii) ownership and other internal
characteristics; (iii) communication technology; and (iv) the rm's engagement in the product-market.
2.1 Dependant Variable
Our dependent variable Decentralization identies rms that have one individual solely responsible for a
business's major decisions (centralization, coded 0) or, alternatively, if the rm does not have a unique
decision maker (decentralization, coded 1). This has the advantage of not conating `delegation' and `decen-
3Note, as some key variables, including our dependent variable are only available for one year, our results are cross-section
estimates.
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tralization'. Moreover, our dependent variable is also a direct measure of the structure of decision making in
that we identify whether there is a unique decision maker over a set of major decisions, rather than relying
on a composite measure of decision making or a general indication of the degree of worker autonomy.
Table 1: Who is a Decision Maker?a
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
EDUCATION
School 0:341 0:473 0 1
Trade 0:241 0:426 0 1
Tertiary 0:377 0:484 0 1
GENDER
Male 0:931 0:123 0 1
Female 0:069 0:003 0 1
QUALIFICATIONS
Years Experience 15:601 10:537 1 42
Business Training 0:528 0:156 0 1
Notes: a) Source BLS 95-98. These summary statistics are in terms of those
businesses which responded \yes" to having a unique decision-maker; ap-
proximately 4.4 per cent of rms with sole decision makers did not answer
the Education question.
Who is a sole decision maker? Table 1 reports that approximately 93 per cent of individuals with sole
responsibility for their business's major decisions descriptive are male. This is in stark contrast to the
percentage of female worker proprietors, partners or directors (27 per cent of the total number of directors),
of other managers (22 per cent of the total number of other managers) and the percentage of part and
fulltime employees (30 and 59 per cent respectively) in the surveyed businesses. Second, approximately 38
per cent of those responsible for the major decisions of the rm have tertiary qualications. Interesting in
light of the predictions of Hart and Moore (2005) that generalists should supervise specialists, 53 per cent of
those with tertiary education received qualications in business management, commerce or administration.
Third, sole decision makers tend to have extensive on-the-job experience, with an average of 15-and-a-half
years in management.
2.2 Explanatory variables
Ownership.| To investigate the relation between family ownership and decentralization, we include several
measures of family involvement in our estimations. First, the dummy variable Family indicates whether the
rm considers itself to be a family business (1) or not (0) { approximately 27 per cent of the rms sampled
are family businesses. This variable is included in the estimates for Model I. Second, three additional dummy
variables relating to the nature of the family business are included in Model II: (i) Director indicates whether
family members are directors or proprietors of the business; (ii) Decision Maker indicates whether family
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members contribute to decision making but are non-working members of the business; and (iii) Employee
indicates whether family members are employees of the organization. It is important to note that these
variables are not mutually exclusive. Descriptive statistics for each of these measures are provided in Table 2;
they show that 91 per cent of family rms have family members who are directors or proprietors. Third, we
have information about how many generations a rm has been in the family. For the estimation in Model III
we include separate dummies for a family rm: (i) in its rst generation (1st generation); (ii) 2nd generation;
or (iii) if ownership has been in the family for three or more generations (3rd generation).
Table 2: Breakdown of Family Businessesa
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Director 0:910 0:285 0 1
Decisions 0:092 0:289 0 1
Employee 0:476 0:499 0 1
Notes: a) Source BLS 95-98. b) It is important to note that these summary
statistics are in terms of those businesses which responded \yes" to being a
family business.
Table 3: Number of generations of family businessa
Variable Number (Proportion)
No generations 5699(73:19)
1st generation 1380(17:72)
2nd generation 550(7:06)
3rd (or more) generations 158(2:03)
Notes: a) Source BLS 95-98.
To explore the relationship between ownership and decision-making protocols more generally, we include
the variable Equity that measures the percentage of equity not under the control of either a director, owner
or proprietor. This variable indicates how widely held ownership is; the more widely held ownership (and the
smaller the stake of a director) the greater need there is to have checks and balances on his or her decisions.
Hence, we follow Fama and Jensen (1983) in predicting that the decentralization of decision making is more
likely when the ownership widely held. Conversely, if a director or proprietor has a major ownership in the
rm, there is less concern about the divergence of interests between a principal and agent { hence, smaller
values of Equity increase the likelihood there is a co-location of decision management and decision control
rights (centralization).
Size and structure.| We include variables pertaining to the size and structure of the rm. Following
Acemoglu et al. (2007), the variable Size is coded as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees.
Previous studies suggest that delegation is more likely in larger rms (see Colombo and Delmastro (2004)
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and Meagher and Wait (2014); we predict a similar result relating to decentralization. This is because
centralization of decision making is less feasible in larger rms that likely face a greater number and range
of decisions, requiring a broader knowledge base unlikely to be found in one single decision maker.
The variable Contract Out species whether the rm contracted out activities previously undertaken
within the boundaries of the rm. We predict that if a principal is able to contract out peripheral tasks,
centralization is more likely for the narrower set of decisions that remain.
Locations is a dummy variable indicating whether the business operates over multiple locations (1) or not
(0). Colombo and Delmastro (2004), and Meagher and Wait (2014) found that centralization is more likely
when a rm has more than one plant undertaking similar activities, consistent with the idea of economies
of scale in decision making and with the need for coordination between sections of the rm (Alonso et al.,
2008).
Levels measures the number of managerial employees as a proportion of the total number of employees.
Colombo and Delmastro (2004) present evidence suggesting that rms with atter hierarchial structures are
more likely to be centralized. Acemoglu et al. (2007) also make the point that an increase in managerial
employees lends itself to greater autonomy and a higher degree of decentralized decision making.
Business Plan indicates whether the rm has a formal strategic plan (1 if so, 0 otherwise). Explicitly
documenting its strategy in this manner could suggest that a central manager has made the major decisions,
and is using the plan to communicate the plan to lower-level employees in the hierarchy. We predict that the
adoption of a formal business plan will be associated with higher levels of centralization. This interpretation
suggests that the plan is a way of communicating the manager's vision to the employees.
Information.| We also include variables relating the informational systems and requirements of the
business. The dummy variable Comparison indicates whether a rm made any formal comparisons with
other rms in their industry (1 if yes, 0 if not). The ability to benchmark enhances a principal's access to
relevant information, potentially aiding centralization. Given that formal comparisons are only feasible if
rms are suciently similar, this result complements the ndings of Acemoglu et al. (2007) that industry
heterogeneity contributes to delegation.
We also include variables on the owner's Tenure separated into ve distinct cohorts: less than 2 years of
ownership, 2-5 years of ownership, 5 to 10, 10 to 20, and over 20 years of ownership. Acemoglu et al. (2007)
also argue that older rms are more likely to be centralized because the experience of senior management
aords the opportunity to observe and accumulate public signals concerning performance and technology.
Further, the control variable Network indicates whether the rm has a networked administrative computer
system (1) or not (0). Bloom et al. (2009a) nd that the adoption of intranet communication technology
was associated with centralization; on the other hand, Colombo and Delmastro (2004) nd that delegation
is more frequent in rms that have networked computer systems, interpreting their result as consistent with
the idea that information systems allow for better monitoring of subordinate behavior.
Finally, a rm may have dierent informational requirements or greater competitive pressures when it
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competes in an export market. This could possibly lead to a dierent choice of decision-making structure.
For instance, Meagher and Wait (2014) nd that exporters tend to delegate decisions on major change
or restructuring; they argue that exporters face more complex decisions and signicant costs of delay, a
situation that encourages greater delegation. On the other hand, Meagher and Wang (2008) suggest that
centralization will be preferred if it avoids delays; Bloom et al. (2010) argue that competitive export markets
can provide an incentive against delegation if greater competition reduces incentives for agents to invest
when protability is blunted. To investigate this relationship we include the variable Export that is coded
as 1 if the rm exports goods or services and 0 otherwise.
Table 4 lists the variables of interest and their summary statistics for the estimation sample.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample (n=7787)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Decision making
Decentralization :377 0:485 0 1
Ownership
Family 0:268 0:443 0 1
Director 0:251 0:433 0 1
Decisions 0:023 0:150 0 1
Employee 0:135 0:342 0 1
1st generation 0:177 0:382 0 1
2nd generation 0:071 0:256 0 1
3rd generation 0:020 0:141 0 1
Equity 0:186 0:379 0 1
Size and structure
Size 2:542 1:163 0:693 5:278
Contract Out 0:072 0:259 0 1
Locations 0:212 0:409 0 1
Levels 0:355 0:307 0 1
Business Plan 0:279 0:449 0 1
Information
Comparison 0:267 0:442 0 1
Tenure 2 0:103 0:304 0 1
2 <Tenure 5 0:173 0:378 0 1
5 <Tenure 10 0:254 0:435 0 1
10 <Tenure 20 0:271 0:445 0 1
Tenure > 20 0:199 0:399 0 1
Network 0:404 0:491 0 1
Export 0:140 0:347 0 1
Notes: Source BLS 95-98.
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3 Empirical Results
We estimate a probit model of the probability of decentralization as a function of the ownership, size and
structure, information variables and 2-digit industry dummy variables. The estimated marginal eects are
reported in Tables 5 for the three models using the dierent measures of family ownership. As noted previ-
ously, our reduced-form estimates do not imply causality, however, our results do highlight some relationships
of interest. We discuss the results related to each of these key aspects in turn. All probit estimations for
Models I, II and III are calculated with the full set of controls using clustered standard errors at the 2-digit
industry level. We discuss the result for ownership, size and structure and informational requirements in
turn.
3.1 Ownership
Focusing on Model I, the coecient on Family is negative and signicant (at the 5% level); a family businesses
is approximately 5 percentage points more likely to have one individual responsible for the major decisions
than non-family businesses. This result supports the empirical ndings of Feltham and Barnett (2005)
that family-owned rms often have more centralized decision-making than non-family rms. This result is
also consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) { there is no need to separate decision control and decision
management when the decision maker is a major residual claimant.
We further explore the relationship between decision making and the type of family ownership in Model II.
First, the coecient on Director is negative and signicant; there is a 6 percentage point increase in the
probability of centralization when a family owner is a director. By contrast, centralization is not statistically
more likely in family rms than in their non-family counterparts when family owners do not work at the
establishment, but are contributors to decision making. If family members are non-working decision makers,
it could be the case that there is a collaborative relationship between those external family owners and senior
management, resulting in a separation of decision control and management rights. The other family dummies
(Employee and Decisions) are also insignicant at conventional levels, however both categories have relatively
small numbers of observations. In all, however, these results suggests that the type of family ownership
potentially matters for the structure of decision making. As a whole, these results suggest that the analysis
of decision making in family rms needs to account for the type of family involvement in the organization.
That is, our ndings suggest that family businesses attempt to design their organizational architecture in
response to the degree and nature of family involvement, given the dierent ownership structures and the
incentives it creates.
Model III examines the relationship between generations of family ownership and use of a single major
decision maker. 1st generation family rms are 5 percentage points more likely to centralize, and 2nd
generation family rms have an increase in 7.4 percentage points in the probability of centralization.4 The
4Note, there marginal eects are not signicantly dierent at conventional levels.
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marginal eects for 3rd generation family rms is not signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting no statistical
dierence between these rms and non-family operations. Several researchers suggest that succession in
family rms is critical and could result in a change in organizational architecture, and nancial returns
(see Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Cucculelli and Micucci (2008)). Notably, Saito
(2008) found that the performance of family rms both owned and managed by descendants of the founder
to be inferior to their non-family counterparts. However, following succession family rms benetted from
a separation of ownership and control, in that their nancial performance improved if they employed an
outside (non-family) professional manager. Further to this, Nguyen and Wait (2012) suggest a change in
decision-making structures could eventuate after succession, given dierences in the preferences of the parent-
principal and the successor child. Our empirical study presented here adds to this literature, indicating that
centralization is more likely when the rm is operated by the founding generation.
Turning our attention to how widely ownership in the rm is held, in all three models the marginal
eect on Equity is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level; this suggests that a decrease in the
percentage of rm equity under the control of either a director or proprietor is associated with an increase
in the probability of decentralization. Again, this result is consistent with the argument of Fama and Jensen
(1983) that there should be a separation of decision management and decision control rights (hence some
form of decentralization) when a decision maker is not a major residual claimant.
3.2 Size and structure
With an increase in rm Size, there is an increase in the probability of having more than one key decision
maker. Typically a larger rm will have more decisions, requiring a diverse range of knowledge. This lends
itself to using more than one decision maker. Moreover, given the limits of managerial attention, as the
number of decisions needing to be made grows, one decision maker is less likely to be able to cope with
the work load on their own. This nding is consistent with the increased use of delegation in larger rms
(Colombo and Delmastro (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Meagher and Wait (2014)).
If a rm opts to Contract Out activities formally undertaken within the rm itself, it has a approximately
a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of centralizing by using one key decision maker. Contracting
out limits the number of activities, and hence the specic knowledge required by a single decision maker.
Contracting out allows a rm to focus on its core activities, increasing the likelihood that one individual has
the requisite knowledge to make the major decisions.
When it operates in more than one Location, there is an increase in the probability of centralization in
a rm by 3 percentage point (consistent across all three Models, and signicant at the 10% level). This
is consistent with the nding of both Colombo and Delmastro (2004) and Meagher and Wait (2014) who
found that centralization was more likely when a rm had multiple locations undertaking similar activities.
This result could be indicative of several things. This could be reective of the need to centralize when
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Table 5: Decentralization of Decision Making: Probit Marginal Eects with clustered standard errors
Variable Model I Std. Err. Model II Std. Err. Model III Std. Err.
Ownership
Family  :0512 :024 - - - -
Director - -  :058 :024 - -
Decisions - - :036 :029 - -
Employee - - :003 :015 - -
1st generation - - - -  :051 :024
2nd generation - - - -  :074 :027
3rd generation - - - - :040 :115
Equity :116 :028 :115 :027 :327 :043
Size and structure
ln(Size) :061 :015 :061 :015 :061 :015
Contract Out  :035 :016  :035 :016  :034 :016
Locations  :028 :016  :029 :015  :030 :015
Levels :140 :024 :143 :025 :396 :072
Business Plan  :045 :014  :046 :014  :045 :014
Information
Comparison  :073 :013  :074 :014  :073 :014
Tenure 2 :053 :030 :054 :030 :057 :030
2 <Tenure 5 :085 :021 :086 :021 :089 :021
5 <Tenure 10 :066 :017 :067 :017 :070 :017
10 <Tenure 20 :020 :015 :021 :015 :024 :016
Network  :046 :011  :045 :011  :046 :011
Export  :034 :016  :034 :016  :035 :0161
Industry Yes - Yes - Yes -
N 7787 - 7787 - 7787 -
lnL  4920:542 -  4919:192 -  4916:905 -
Notes:, ,  represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of signicance, respectively. b) Except for the generations and
the Age variables, marginal eects calculated at the mean of each variable and a rm with its owner's tenure set
between 10 and 20 years. The marginal eects for the generations dummy variables are calculated at the mean of
each variable, for a rm with its owner's tenure set between 10 and 20 years relative to the default of a non-family
business. The marginal eects for the Age variables calculated at sample means for all variables relative to the
default of an owner with more than 20 years experience. Marginal eects for discrete variables are calculated for a
change from 0 to 1.
coordination between plants is important (Alonso et al. (2008) and Hart and Moore (2005)).
Levels measures the proportion of employees who are managers. Managers are typically have higher
levels of skill and education, making them better placed to make important decisions (Garicano (2000)). The
estimated marginal eect conforms with our expectation { there is an increase in use of multiple decision
makers when there is a higher proportion of the rm who are managers.
Finally, there is a decrease in approximately 4.5 percentage points in the probability of decentralization if
a rm has a formal business plan, signicant at the 1% level. If a decision maker has the requisite information,
a formal business plan in one way of communicating this with the employees in the organization.
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3.3 Information
If a rm makes formal Comparisons with other rms in their industry, there is approximately a 7 per-
centage point increase in the probability of centralization; this result is consistent across all three Models.
Performance comparisons allow a manager to collect information, which would help with decision making.
However, further to that, a manager in a position to establish a formal benchmarking process must already
have a signicant amount of information about what to measures are important and how to interpret the
data when it arrives. This echoes the arguments of Acemoglu et al. (2007) that a principal will not be able
to retain decision-making rights if they do not have the requisite information, which is more likely when a
rm is close to the productivity frontier.
On a similar note, Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis
that newer rms are more likely to delegation. Our data allows for the examination of a related issue {
owner tenure. Concentrating on Model I, our results suggest that, overall, rms with newer owners are
relatively more decentralized than organizations with an owner with a longer tenure (all coecients are
in relation to the omitted category of Tenure> 20 years). This empirical nding is consistent with the
idea that experience helps the owner attain the requisite knowledge to make key decisions, reducing the
need to delegate authority to agents with an informational advantage lower down in the hierarchy. There
is, moreover, a slight concavity in the Tenure marginal eects, which increase then subsequently decrease
through the categories for owners with a longer tenure { a likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that
the dierence between adjacent Tenure marginal eects are the same (2(2) = 6:74, p > 2 = 0:03). It is
possible that new owners sometimes wish to centralize to set a strategic direction for their newly acquired
enterprize, and this mitigate the informational disadvantage they have which would otherwise encourage
decentralization.5
Our estimation of the coecient on Network, indicates a negative and signicant relationship between
the implementation of networked administrative communication technology and decentralization (at the 1%
level); rms that adopt network communication technologies are 5 percentage points less likely to be decen-
tralized than rms that have not adopted such technologies. This is consistent with the use of communication
technologies to gather information and monitor agents' eort by the principal (see Bloom et al. (2009b) for
a discussion).
Meagher and Wait (2014) found that an exporter is more likely to delegate a decision regarding a major
change in the workplace as compared with a non-exporter. Our empirical estimates show that rms that
export are approximately 3 percentage points more likely to centralize than non-exporters (5% level of
signicance). There are some key dierences in these two studies, however. As noted, they study the
delegation of a major decision regarding change in a workplace; here, we study the use of one or more than
one decision maker for all of the rm's key decisions. Both studies indicate, however, that product-market
5An alternative to this explanation is that inexperienced owners try to centralize and do it, only realize their hubris. After
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factors are potentially important considerations for a rm when it chooses its decision-making protocols.
4 Concluding Comments
One key theme in the literature is that family rms are dierent (for example, Sraer and Thesmar (2007)
and Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) suggest a dierence in nancial returns between non-family and family
owned rms).6 Our results indicate that family rms are dierent, but not in unpredictable ways. Using
the separation of decision management and decision control rights (Fama and Jensen, 1983) as a foundation
for our analysis, we examine whether an organization uses: (i) one individual for all of its major decisions
(centralization); or (ii) more than one individual is involved (a decentralized decision-making structure).
Family rms are more centralized than non-family rms, particularly when family ownership takes the form
of a family member being the director of the business. There is, however, no increase in the likelihood of the
use of one key decision maker in family rms characterized by family owners who contribute to the decision-
making process but do not personally work at the rm, and in family-owned businesses with family-member
employees. These results are consistent with the theory of Fama and Jensen (1983); decision making is more
likely to be split between agents to reduce agency problems when decision makers are not major wealth
holders. First and second generation family rms are also more likely to be centralized than their non-family
owned counterparts. On the other hand, family operations with three or more generations of ownership are
no more likely to centralize than non-family rms.
This study complements previous studies on the delegation of decision-making rights with its focus on
the single/multiple decision-maker choice of a rm. Decentralization is more likely when there is more
equity held by individuals who are not the director or proprietor. Decentralization is also more likely in
larger rms and have a relatively inexperienced owner. Both results suggest that when key information
is dispersed, decision-making rights will be decentralized. Similarly, in an attempt to utilize their human
capital, decentralization is also more likely when a rm has a large fraction managers. Centralization, in
the form of using one key decision maker for all major decisions, is more frequent when: a rm contracts
out activities they previously used to undertake; benchmarks performance; and has a formal business plan.
Information again seems to be the key element here; centralization is feasible when the principal can obtain
(and disseminate) the requisite information, or when the principal can manipulate the rm's tasks so that
she does have the requirement knowledge to make an informed decision. Finally, there is a increase in the use
of centralization when a rm operates at more than one location. This nding is consistent with arguments
that centralization aids coordination (Alonso et al. (2008)).
6Also see Chami (2001).
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